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Who are we and where are we going: From Past Myths to Present Politics   




Social groups, and the social identities which people develop as part of them, are 
often experienced as stable and continuous over time. Thus, countries experiencing 
rapid socio-political change often face the challenge of re-constructing the meaning of 
the social group to adapt to the demands of the present, while simultaneously making 
this re-construction appear as a natural progression of ‘our’ historical journey. In the 
present paper, I ask the question of how, in times of socio-political change, the past is 
used in the present, and the implications this has for how individuals represent their 
nation’s future. Drawing on Serbia and its political movement towards EU 
integration, the present article illustrates how developed and legitimized historical 
narratives, linked to the myth of origin of a nation, become utilized to frame present 
challenges. In doing so, it allows for uncertainties in the present to become anchored 
in established historical narratives, which in turn have consequences for which 
political actions are deemed acceptable and legitimate for the future.  
 
Introduction 
Scholars working on collective memory, identity, history and inter-group relations 
have argued, and illustrated, that social groups, such as a nation, are frequently 
constructed as stable over time and space (Alonso, 1988; Jetten & Hutchison, 2011; 
Jovchelovitch, 2012; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Penic, Elcheroth & Reicher, 2016; Sani, 
Bowe, Herrera, Manna, Cossa, Miao & Zhou, 2007). Sani et al. (2007) use the 
concept of ‘perceived collective continuity’ to illustrate how groups perceive links 
between their past, present and future, and the implications this has for intergroup 
relations and political decision-making.  
 
In the present paper, we ask the question of how, in times of socio-political change, 
the past is used in the present, and the implications this has for how individuals 
represent their nation’s future. The article begins by first discussing the social 
psychological literature on historical myths and narratives, and the role these play in 
providing a sense of attachment to an essentialized version of national identity. 
Secondly, it draw on social representations theory to argue that, the ability of 
historical myths to persist over time is due to their adaptive nature, understood 
through the concept of ‘thema’. Thirdly, drawing on qualitative data from Serbia, it 
illustrates the ways in which developed historical narratives about a nation’s origins 
and identity become utilized to anchor present politics, thus providing a template from 
which to understand socio-political change. Lastly, the article discusses the 
implications of this for how individuals come to conceptualize the future of their 
nation, and their role in shaping it.  
 
Identity Continuity: Myths of origin and historical narratives 
For scholars interested in issues of national identification, nationalism and intergroup 
relations, understanding the historical contexts in which these develop becomes 
crucial. Because of this, there is a growing acknowledgment of the importance of 
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history in providing the material through which social groups, such as nations, are 
developed and maintained, with scholars emphasizing the importance of promoting a 
psychology that includes history in its analysis (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Reicher & 
Hopkins, 2001).  
History becomes important as it tells a story of where a nation and its people 
come from by providing it with foundational myths (Malinowski, 1926) and historical 
charters (Liu & Hilton, 2005). These constructs bind the past with the present and 
future of a nation and its people by defining the origins of the group, but also its role 
in relation to other nations.  
Liu and Hilton (2005) have argued that nations have particular ‘historical 
charters’ that define their identities and their role vis-à-vis other nations. A historical 
charter provides a narrative of a group’s origins, which in turn functions to 
legitimizing present socio-political actions intended to promote a future that is 
perceived as continuous with the past. Considering this, Liu & Hilton argue that the 
different responses of England, France and Germany to the 9/11 aftermath can be 
understood by the different historical missions, and identities, of the nations.  
The importance of drawing on history to legitimize not only the present, but 
also proposed projects for the future, places historical myths and narratives at the 
centre in creating a sense of stability and continuity in a nation. The idea of 
‘perceived collective continuity’ (Sani et al., 2007) conceptualizes the ways in which 
we see our social groups and consequently social identities, as stable constructs 
moving through time. The construction of a perceived collective continuity assures 
that “within the national imagination, we are rendered immortal, forever reproduced 
through the timelessness of metaphorical genealogy” (Alonso, 1988, p.40). However, 
while perceived collective continuity functions to essentialize a national identity as 
stable and outside of the boundaries of time, it is important to note that historical 
continuity “is not derived from a passive act of perception [but rather] involves an 
active process of selection, interpretation and construction” which is always future-
oriented (Reicher, 2008, p.151). Thus, an inclusion of history into the study of 
psychological phenomena does not entail taking a deterministic and static approach to 
topics of interest, but rather it provides a framework through which to understand how 
socio-political change becomes (and dissent silenced) possible by embedding it within 
legitimized narratives of group belonging (Obradović & Howarth, 2017; Penic, 
Elcheroth & Reicher, 2016).  
Because of the importance of perceived collective continuity and foundational 
myths in providing a sense of belonging and stability to a group’s identity, in contexts 
of proposed socio-political change, perceived threats to national identity (or group 
identity more generally) frequently lead to unwillingness to support the change (Jetten 
& Hutchison, 2011; Sindic & Reicher, 2009). Identity threats can be based on 
disrupting a sense of continuity from the past, but also a perceived fear of how the 
group will fare in the future. Thus, advocates of change are faced with the challenge 
of representing socio-political change as a continuation, rather than rupture, of group 
identity (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Obradović & Howarth, 2017). As Smith (1995) 
has argued, nationalism should be understood as a form of ‘political archaeology’ 
where history functions to rediscover, reinterpret and regenerate a national 
community.  
However, as is often evident within both reified and lay perspectives on 
history, not all historical events are given equal importance and emphasis within 
nations. Thus, when studying how nations maintain a sense of continuity in times of 
change, we must first understand what parts of history are given centrality to a 
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collective identity, and thus become the elements selected through political 
archaeology . In other words, we must unpack the myths of origin beyond the content 
of the events themselves to understand what they communicate about a nation’s 
identity. We can do this by drawing on the social representations theory and the 
concept of thema, to understand how supposedly fixed events of the past become re-
negotiated and kept alive through times of change.  
 
Social Representations and Thema: Unearthing the Core of Identities 
Myths of origin persist due to their dialogical nature. They are, like identities, 
constantly re-presented and re-negotiated to provide a historically rooted legitimacy 
for present ingroup goals and identities. The theory of social representations 
(hereafter SRT) becomes a useful theoretical framework through which we can 
understand how historical events become part of common-sense knowledge, and 
communicate something about who ‘we’ are, and how ‘we’ should act.  
At the core of SRT (Moscovici, 2000; Howarth, 2006) is an emphasis on how 
we make sense of the world and thus how knowledge is socially created and re-
presented. This becomes particularly relevant to understand in the study of how 
history, psychology and politics become intertwined. For example, the popular saying 
that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” (originally 
coined by George Santayana) illustrates the powerful nature of history as a source of 
legitimacy in shaping and mobilizing groups for certain political actions, supposedly 
intended to safeguard the group for re-living past atrocities (or failures to hinder 
them).  
Social representations of history thus serve a vital function in providing both 
the content (meaning) of identities as well as providing an understanding of the 
processes through which this meaning becomes shared, re-interpreted and resisted 
through communication. The past, and the ways in which it is remembered, is thus 
constantly in a process of reconstruction. Historical representations, and their 
corresponding cultural signs and symbols, will become remembered or forgotten 
“depending on their ability to fulfil the needs of different social, political and cultural 
functions” (Jovchelovitch, 2012, p.444). Social representations of history further 
provide an addition to research on social (particularly national) identities in 
acknowledging the importance of place and space in creating a sense of psychological 
attachment to a physical reality (Hopkins & Dixon, 2006). By considering how 
historical events (often tied to specific territories or lands) shape identities and create 
a sense of continuity, we can also understand how identities encompass a spatial 
dimension, which comes to have implications for geopolitics and the management of 
boundaries and belonging.  
The concept of ‘thema’ can be seen as the “basic starting point for generating 
social representations” (Markova, 2000, p. 442). Originating in the work of Holton 
(1975), thema and themata were originally defined as antinomies of thought found in 
science (see also, Liu, 2004). Developing this further, Markova (2000; 2003) argues 
that common sense thinking is characterizes by antinomies of thinking, where 
opposites such as “we/them” come to shape our way of understanding the social 
world. According to Markova (2000) not all antinomies become themata. Rather, this 
occurs “if, in the course of certain social and historical events, e.g., political, 
economic, religious, and so on, they turn into problems and become the focus of 
social attention and a source of tension and conflict.” (Markova, 2000, p. 184). 
Themata then, allow us to explore “the socio-historical embeddedness” of social 
representations in a non-reductive way (Liu, 2004, p. 254).  
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Applying the concept of thema to social representations of history and social 
identities allows us to understand how an ingroup’s identity can be built on opposites. 
For example, Jovchelovitch (2012) found that the oppositional nature of the 
foundational myth of the Brazilian people functioned to celebrate the ‘mixedness’ of 
its identity, and to allow for inclusion and endurance by being inherently dynamic and 
complex. Similarly, in the context of Serbia, the myth of origin (discussed more in 
detail below) emphasizes an identity that is simultaneously victimized and 
strong/resilient (Bieber, 2002). Thus, SRT in general, and the concept of thema in 
particular, becomes useful for unearthing the links between foundational myths, 
ingroup identities and the ways in which socio-political change becomes understood.  
 
Continuity in Times of Change: The case of Serbia 
By understanding foundational myths, and the historical charters which they become 
part of, through the concept of thema we can begin to unpack the dynamic function 
that historical representations serve for national identities, and the role they come to 
play in shaping how present socio-political changes are understood and oriented 
towards. The present article focuses on unpacking how a particular historical event, 
the battle of Kosovo, became a core myth through which ingroup identity was 
understood in Serbia, but also intergroup relations and present politics. However, 
before we can unpack this, we must give some context to the event itself.  
The issue of the political status of Kosovo is perhaps the biggest hurdle for 
Serbia on its path towards EU membership. Kosovo is a region in (or below) Southern 
Serbia that declared independence from Serbia in 2008 (after years of conflict and 
with a predominantly non-Serbian population). The territory holds a prominent 
identity position among Serbs as it was the territory on which the legendary battle of 
Kosovo took place in 1389 and has continued to be a site of conflict between Serbs 
and Kosovars in the past 20 years. This story of the battle is one of both victory and 
defeat. Namely, in 1389 Prince Lazar led Serbia into battle against the more powerful 
Ottoman forces, which were invading the country in an attempt to conquer it. As 
Bieber (2002, p. 96) argues; 
 
“According to the myth, on the eve of the battle, Knez Lazar was 
offered the choice between establishing either a heavenly or an 
earthly kingdom. Lazar chose the former, which prevented his 
victory the following day but ensured the creation of a perpetual 
heavenly realm for the Serbian people.’ 
 
Consequently, from the fifteenth century and onwards (until the 18th century) Serbia 
was under Ottoman rule, a period known as the epoch of Turkish slavery (Cirkovic, 
2004, p. xx). The Kosovo myth gained significance only after this period as the 
foundational myth of a newly independent Serbian state in the late 1800s (Bieber, 
2002). The reproduction of the myth through cultural symbols, songs, religious 
holidays and celebrations has further solidified the image of Kosovo in Serbia, 
making it an everyday and banal symbol of nationalism and national identity (Billig, 
1995). It further legitimizes claims to the territory of modern-day Kosovo by 
constructing the region as the physical embodiment of a psychological belonging to 
the nation (Hopkins & Dixon, 2006). 
The narrative that the myth communicates is one which emphasizes how the 
Serbian people were simultaneously victims (under Turkish power) but also strong 
and resilient when faced with a seemingly more powerful opponent. In a way, the 
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myth draws on an oppositional pair of victory (spiritual) and defeat (physical), with 
the former proving more significant on a symbolic level than the latter.  
Although the EU is said to hold no position towards the independence issue, 
continued efforts have been made to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo. 
These efforts in turn have domestically led many to believe that Serbia would 
(eventually) have to make a decision between EU membership and Kosovo (Ker-
Lindsay, 2009, p.6), a trade-off with consequences extending far beyond the sphere of 
geopolitics.   
 
Method: 
The present paper asks the question of how, in times of socio-political change, the 
past is used in the present, and the implications this has for how individuals represent 
their nation’s future. It does so by drawing on qualitative data gathered in Serbia, 
exploring how citizens perceive their country’s movement towards joining the 
European Union, and the (positive/negative) implications this might have for their 
collective future.  
 
Study Design 
As the aim of this study was to explore the ways in which lay representations of 
history become part of understanding the present and future, a qualitative approach 
was deemed most suitable. Particularly as research on social representations is best 
explored “in the in-between space we create in dialogue and negotiation with others” 
(Howarth, 2006, p.68). With this in mind, 12 focus group (FG) sessions were 
conducted between April 2015 and April 2016 in four cities in Serbia, two in the 
North (Novi Sad and Belgrade) and two in the South (Nis and Vranje) of the country. 
These comprised of meeting the same 4 groups (one from each city) at three different 
time-points (April 2015, September 2015 and April 2016). The rationale behind this 
design was to develop an iterative method through which in-depth tensions could be 
explored more fully, by returning to the same participants with new questions, rooted 
in the discussions from the previous session. Furthermore this design was seen as 
complimentary to the theoretical framework both in terms of the focus on perceived 
continuity, but also the emphasis that SRT places on communication. Namely, it 
highlights the role of dialogue in the process of generating and re-negotiating socially 
shared knowledge, and iterative FGs were seen as an innovative method for capturing 
this in situ. Lastly, the selection of cities in the north and south reflected an interest in 
exploring the importance of physical proximity to Kosovo in shaping opinions, and 
understandings, of the importance of the region for Serbian identity, and subsequently 
collective continuity in the future.  
 
Participants 
32 individuals participated in this study, 10 of which were female and 23 male. 
Participants ranged in age from 19 to 55, with median age 31 (at time of first FG 
sessions; for participant demographics see table 1). Participants were recruited 
through snowballing. For each of the first FGs, one participant was contacted via 
telephone and (if they accepted) came to serve as the point of contact for that 
particular city, helping the researcher organize a setting in which to conduct the FG, 
as well as gain access to other potential participants. The rationale behind the 
sampling choice of these individuals was not to reach statistical representativeness or 
generalisability, but rather to explore the diversity in beliefs and opinions expressed 
by a larger pool of individuals from different parts of the country (Barbour & 
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Kitzinger, 1999, p.7). The first round of FGs comprised of 7 – 9 participants. In some 
instances, certain individuals brought a friend, co-worker or family member 
(particularly if they did not know any of the prior invited participants). In order to 
maintain a good rapport with the participants, these additional participants were 
allowed to join the FG discussions. However, due to the nature of the study design, an 
average of 2 participants per FG did not attend the second and third sessions.  
 
******************insert table 1 here****************** 
 
Procedure 
All FGs took place in ‘natural’ settings such as cafes and participant’s homes. Within 
each group, participants were introduced to the moderator, the aims of the study, as 
well as the intended procedure of the FG. Participants were told that “together with 
another 5-7 people, you will discuss certain topics and questions that will be provided 
by the moderator. All I ask you to do is state your honest opinion about these topics 
and engage in discussion with the other participants.” Following this, participants 
were given an information sheet (which repeated some of this information) and a 
consent form to sign. Also, to ensure confidentiality (and address any concerns about 
anonymity) participants were asked to provide their name, age and occupation to the 
group prior to the audio recording commenced and these were saved in collected field 
notes. The topic guides for each three sessions followed the same format, including 
questions covering themes of politics, identity, the past and the future (see table 2). 
After conducting the first round of FGs (April 2015), any remaining issues, tensions 
or points of debate for each question were used to inform the topic guide for the 
second session, thereby allowing the data-collection to follow an iterative design 
where the researcher was able to go back to the participants to gain further insight on 
questions which had remained unanswered. FG discussions lasted between 33 and 87 
minutes, with an average length of one hour and five minutes.  
 
 
*************insert table 2 here************* 
 
All FGs were conducted (and subsequently analysed) in Serbian. The ability to 
conduct the FGs in Serbian overcame an important language barrier. However, while 
the researcher is of Serbian ethnic-origin, she was not born nor has ever lived in 
Serbia (which was disclosed to the participants). This positioned her as both an 
insider and outsider in all group discussions and influenced the dynamics of the FG 
discussions in an interesting way, as participants reflexively positioned the researcher 
as both a source of Western knowledge and practice, but also a representative of a 
non-Serbian world that inherently misunderstood the lived experiences of Serbian 
people. In order to ensure participant confidentiality all names and identifiers were 
modified during transcription.  
 
Analysis 
The audio recorded FGs were transcribed verbatim and a thematic analysis was 
conducted following the guidelines outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). All 
transcripts were coded using NVivo 11, a qualitative data software program. The 
analytical procedure was also iterative and consisted of firstly coding the transcripts 
from the first set of FGs (hereon FG1), from which an initial codebook was developed 
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and subsequently applied to FG2 and FG3 transcripts. As additional codes were added 
during the analysis of FG2 and FG3 transcripts, the FG1 transcripts had to be re-
analysed as well. The analytical procedure was deductive, focusing on coding for 
references to change (socio-political and cultural), historical events, political attitudes 
and references to the past and the future. The data was coded on a semantic level, and 
the initial codebook consisted of 76 codes. These were re-read and combined into 
themes. After revising some themes, the final codebook included 72 Codes, 17 themes 
and three organizing themes. For each organizing theme there were tensions that arose 
between the various theme (i.e., between independence and inclusion) which captured 
the ‘essence’ of each organizing theme, of which the various topics discussed became 
manifestations of. These tensions are the basis of each of the three subsections of 




At the heart of the data, were tensions around managing a sense of continuity in times 
of change. Namely, as the analysis will show, both the past, the present and the future 
become understood through the foundational thema of Serbian identity; victimhood 
and resilience. This antinomy functioned to both make sense of the domestic and 
international context of Serbia, and became thematized due to the tensions which 
arose around answering the question of ‘who we are’ and which political direction we 
should take in the future.  
The results section is divided into three parts, each addressing one of these 
‘tensions’. The first relates to how the political and symbolic meaning of Kosovo is 
narrated and the implications this has for the construction of a Serbian identity, the 
second considers how this narrative becomes utilized in explaining the domestic 
socio-political context and addressing the tension of who is to blame for a lack of 
progress, and the third section explores its application to meaning-making on an 
international scale, which at root is a debate about how to maintain a sense of 
sovereignty while becoming part of a seemingly hierarchical and stigmatizing union.  
 
Narrating Kosovo: Tensions between De Facto and De Jure 
Within the various FGs over the one-year time frame, participants were asked about 
the historical and political significance of Kosovo. Discussions often centred on the 
tension between the historical and symbolic importance of the region and 
acknowledging the political reality of Kosovo as a ‘de facto’ independent state. When 
asked about the Battle of Kosovo, social representations of the historical event often 
drew on imagery of heroic martyrdom;   
 
Excerpt 1: Belgrade 3 
M3: Uhm, the whole myth is primarily associated with the Battle of Kosovo and 
everything that happened afterwards, and that whole, this great Serbian army, which 
opposed an even greater Turkish army, and our glorified defeat. 
 
Excerpt 2: Nis 3 
W3: Well yes, a small Serbian army which defeated large Turkey [Ottoman Empire]. 
Told as one of the greatest victories of Serbs.  
 
These short excerpts illustrate that within both northern and southern cities in Serbia, 
the battle of Kosovo is narrated in a similar manner. However, what differs is the 
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supposed outcome of the battle, illustrating the extent to which the battle is 
remembered as both a victory and a defeat. When discussions moved from the socio-
historical representations to the political status of Kosovo, participants frequently 
used words such as ‘cradle’ ‘root’ and ‘home’ to anchor the space within the 
boundaries of Serbian belonging, not only as a part, but as encompassing a central 
place.  
 
Excerpt 3: Novi Sad 3: 
M6: I think the question [of the political status of Kosovo] becomes important in 
Serbia because it represents the territory on which the first Serbian state was 
constructed in the 7th century. It is the cradle of today’s national identity, and from 
there, that was, how do I put this… a key territory which was Serbian, from where, no 
matter how much Serbia expended or narrowed, it originated.  
 
Excerpt 4: Vranje 3 
M1: You see, the oldest Serbian monasteries are down there. 
M5: Yes 
M1: Orthodox monasteries, not only Serbian. So…, it’s not for nothing that it’s the 
source of Serbian heritage. 
W4: the cradle of Serbia. 
M5: Yes, from where Serbia originated, from the beginning.  
 
From these excerpts we see how the territory of Kosovo is constructed as the only 
stable point in Serbian history, from which a sense of continuous national identity has 
been build. As Hopkins and Dixon (2006, p.179) argue, “a striking feature of much 
talk about place and identity is the way in which it naturalises people’s relationships 
with territory in politically significant ways.” In relation to Serbia, the psychological 
significance of the battle of Kosovo becomes embodied in the physical territory of the 
region, intertwining attachment and continuity with geopolitical attitudes. This is 
visible in the following excerpt;  
 
Excerpt 5: Belgrade 2 
W1: You know what, theoretically that sentence, “Kosovo is not Serbia” no one will 
say that, but everything else beyond that has been done. So, what does that mean to 
you when you publicly don’t say it but you have a liaison officer to communicate with 
them, you have borders, I mean, I think we’ve already recognized Kosovo, only that 
we’re not saying it…. 
W2: I don’t think there was ever a big problem saying like ‘Kosovo is lost’. But it’s 
what comes after that. –  
W1: It’s not lost, it’s its own state, that’s different 
W2: But no, no, you can always add after that ‘currently’. So, there's always that, this 
moment of the current arrangements in the world, Europe, and so on, so that that’s 
simply the reality now, but I don’t think anyone thinks that it’s something final. 
 
In this exchange, we see the tension between participants when attempting to come to 
terms with the political reality of Kosovo, a reality that stands at odds with a 
perceived collective continuity of the Serbian identity. W2 evokes a statement of 
temporality to argue that, despite the present (independent) status of Kosovo, the 
future is uncertain, and therefore the current political reality is one that is malleable, 
and potentially up for change. While this communicative strategy was common 
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among participants from northern cities, those who lived in the south were less likely 
to even recognize the current political reality of Kosovo as ‘lost’. Instead, the 
proximity of these participants to the physical space of the region and the border 
made the psychological attachment stronger and less flexible in accepting alternative 
representations of the region where it belongs.  
 
What this section has attempted to briefly illustrate is that, the foundational myth of 
Serbia rests on the Battle of Kosovo myth, which highlights a thema drawing on both 
victimhood and strength/resilience. This myth in turn becomes both rooted in the 
present-day physical territory of Kosovo as well as the psychological identification 
individuals feel towards their nation, making any political changes, which cause 
disruption to this continuity, considered threatening to the nation as a whole. While 
the third section will explore this more closely in relation to Serbia’s EU trajectory, 
the following section explores how this myth, and its embeddedness within 
constructions of national identity, becomes part of framing how individuals see their 
relationship vis-à-vis their political elites and the institutions they become affiliated 
with.  
 
The People and Politicians: Managing agency and accountability 
The myth of origin, and its foundational elements which give meaning to the Serbian 
identity, also shape how individuals position themselves vis-à-vis their state. Namely, 
similarly to how the Battle of Kosovo was represented through an imagery of ‘heroic 
martyrdom’, so citizens conceptualize their relationship to their political elites. When 
discussing the necessary changes needed to improve Serbia, discussions centred 
around themes that emphasized a lack of ‘normality’ and institutional order in the 
country, the powerlessness of the public to bring about positive change and therefore 
the naivety of those who believed in change, but also the corruption of politicians and 
continued efforts to suppress dissent and promote a disenfranchised and docile 
citizenry. Consider a context in which participants discussed how political and socio-
economic progress of the nation would become possible;  
 
Excerpt 6: Vranje 2 
M6: Under the condition that Serbia is governed intelligently. 
M1: Intelligent governing means that a person is incorruptible. Honest, meaning, he 
doesn’t have to be a specialist but he has to be honest. 
W3: and how long will that last? 
M2: it can’t 
M1: hold on, just so we’re on the same page here. If I steal from my own house, I 
don’t know, a TV, and sell it, my wife and kids have nothing to watch. Meaning, I 
need that TV. 
W5: That’s right, with this political perspective we haven’t done anything, we’ve even 
gone backwards.  
 
The importance of incorrupt leadership in order to achieve progress in Serbia was an 
important theme that permeated discussions acknowledging that Serbia was ‘lagging 
behind’ other European countries in its modernization and democratization. Within 
this type of argument then, it is the assumption that, while the public is doing their 
part to move forward, this movement is being stifled, and even overturned, by the 
political elite stealing from their “own home”. As one participant argued; 
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Excerpt 7: Belgrade 1: 
M7: It’s a matter of the system, they [EU countries] have an orderly system and then 
they act towards that specific model because they’ve learned to […] and I don’t think 
at all that, okay it’s the Serbian mentality, okay, every nation has its own mentality 
but it’s built over time and only at the level of an orderly state can you see a country 
that serves its people and not the other way around. 
W2: I respect the law and follow it, but then you come to a point where they 
[criminals] don’t pay taxes and laugh in your face when you do. And then you think, 
whatever, why should I give money to the state when it’s robbing me. And then they 
force you to the other side, where you do everything opposite of what is order and 
law, which isn’t your, or at least not my, choice. 
M4: And then they tell you at the end ‘see how you [Serbs] are!’ 
W2: Yeah. But it’s not that we’re like that but that they’ve forced us to the tipping 
point.   
 
As this exchange illustrates, participants rationalize ‘corrupt’ behaviour on the part of 
citizens as an adaptation to the malfunctioning situation that they’re in. In doing so 
they highlight their ability to adapt, persevere and prove resilient, despite the 
continued challenges they face. This exchange furthermore illustrates how the 
stigmatizing representations attached to Serbia (as corrupt) are actually held by the 
political elites, and not Serbian citizens themselves. Instead, by emphasizing 
resilience as an adaptive strategy participants are able to reinterpret seemingly 
negative characteristics into positive,, and even envied, features of the Serbian people. 
This is evident in the exchange below;  
 
Excerpt 8: Vranje 1: 
M6: Look at the past 25 years, this nation has survived so much trauma, from 
economic crises, sanctions, poverty, wars, NATO aggressions, loss of workplace, 
factories closing down, jobs being lost, territory being lost, uhm, all that influences a 
nation in a very stressful way. And it’s a real mystery –  
W5: that we’ve survived 
M6: that people are still surviving, still an exceptionally mentally well people, of 
course we have out problems with –  
 M7: the limits of our tolerance 
M6: meaning everyone is at the tipping point of their tolerance because of these 
everyday stresses and trying to survive, but we’re still here. So I think that, had any 
other nation experienced this, that would have been a disaster. 
M1: People are more or less the same, the only difference is how the situation has 
forced them to act.  
M6: but that’s just proof of how resilient and capable we are as a people. We’re 
ready to overcome any crisis. 
W3: That’s how we grew up, that’s how we’ve learned [to be].  
 
As the present section illustrated, Serbian individuals make a clear distinction 
between a positive Serbia, embodied by the resilient people and a powerful, corrupt 
system (driven by the decisions of politicians) which in turn victimizes them and 
forces them to adapt to seemingly negative behaviours. We see how discourses on 
victimhood and strength/resilience manifest themselves in positioning Serbs as 
bearers, and protectors, of a truly Serbian identity, one which is being stifled from its 
full potential by the acts of greedy politicians. By drawing these links, the participants 
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are inevitably also constructing themselves as continuous with past Serbs, from which 
they have “learned” to be resilient. In the domestic context, the antinomy of 
victimhood/resilience is thematized in attempts to make sense of the present, and 
distinguish between the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ of the nation. Thus, extending this 
further, the victimhood/resilience thema becomes a particular manifestation of a more 
universal thema; we/them. While in the domestic context, this distinction is made 
between we ‘the people’ and them ‘the politicians’, in the context of EU integration, it 
is instead the we ‘the nation’ and them ‘the EU’ which is problematized.  
 
The Nation and the EU: Managing independence and inclusion 
When discussing Serbia’s potential membership into the European Union, issues of 
global powerlessness were central, and these highlighted how a potential future in the 
EU would be one where Serbia would lose three crucial things; 1) sovereignty, 
becoming a colony or cheap labour for the rest of Europe, 2) cultural continuity, being 
forced to ‘Westernize’ and thus strip itself of Serbian values to be replaced by more 
individualistic and capitalistic values, and 3) territory, as EU integration would, it was 
speculated, lead to a choice between joining the union and keeping Kosovo as a part 
of Serbian territory. We provide a quote for each to illustrate the functionality of the 
victimhood/resilience thema.  
 
Excerpt 9: Nis 2:  
M2: The gist of the story is that we’re so small that we can’t play independent but be 
so financially dependent of that same EU, that is over with. We’re being blackmailed, 
a basic colony, we don’t have the opportunity, our budget is filled with EU funds, I 
mean we don’t, we don’t, I think that that’s the reality of it. Values and education and 
whether they want us to join or not, the reality is that we can’t leave that 
[relationship] because our budget is being filled, we haven’t bankrupted thanks to the 
fact that they’re pumping money into us, and that’s as long as we do as we’re told.  
M4: Yeah, we can’t make any kinds of demands.  
 
The use of the word ‘colony’ and the implication that Serbia, due to its financial 
instability has no agency over its own country and politics draws on the victimhood 
element of the thema to position Serbia as moving towards complete loss of 
sovereignty as part of the EU. The asymmetrical power-relationship in turn also has 
consequences beyond politics and economics, stretching into the area of cultural 
values.  
 
Excerpt 10: Vranje 2:  
M5: Although the last few years, I have to admit, that more and more people are 
accepting those influences from the West, becoming worse. 
M2: Before marriage used to be sacred, whatever either does, a divorce was never an 
option, but recently – 
  6:  but that’s coming from the West 
W2: that the West.  
M6: The Western system 
M5: To not respect your parents or family 
W4: nothing good has come from the west 
M5: that’s right. It’s not like before, of course we’re still humanitarian but not the 
same way as before, socially, that doesn’t exist anymore. Earlier, it wasn’t tied to 
money nor the time of the year but simply, the system has changed. 
 12 
 
When discussing how the present is different from the past, participants often 
reference the influences of (Western) capitalism in bringing about values of 
materialism and individualism, which in turn clash with the more “warmer” (Novi 
Sad3, M4) nature of Serbs. These discourses, occurring more frequently in the south 
than north, thus highlight the assumed (and continued) disruption to a more 
collectivist Serbia through the political integration into the EU. Thus, the antinomy of 
victimhood/resilience becomes thematised in the context of present politics as goals 
such as EU integration bring up tensions regarding how to maintain, and protect, a 
sense of perceived collective continuity (Sani et al., 2007). It is not surprising that this 
was discussed more in the south than north, as the southern cities are more rural and 
experience less tourism and interaction with foreign travellers, thus creating more 
distance and assumed differentiation from the non-Serbian other. It also emphasizes 
an underlying belief that Serbian cultural values are neither respected nor wanted 
within the EU. This is particularly evident in quotes attributing stigmatizing 
representations to the beliefs of EU member-states, such as the following two excerpts 
illustrate;  
 
Excerpt 11: Novi Sad 2: 
W2: And the Brits, Swedes and those [countries] look at us, not as second-class 
citizens, but as tenth-class.  
M3: Well when they think that we’re savages […] 
M6: But see, that image will never change because we’ve literally, 20 years, been 
presented as poor, miserable and guilty for everything in this region, and that image 
will never change unless someone comes to this country and meets people.  
 
What is interesting in this exchange is the positioning of Serbian individuals in 
relation to these representations. While participants are aware of the negative 
representations of Serbs held by others, and the extent to which these are because of 
recent political events, they are able to re-negotiate the actual source of these 
representations (Howarth, 2006). Namely, similarly to excerpt 7, we see how 
individuals actively resist these stigmas by arguing that it is only when “someone 
comes to this country and meets people”, meaning that it is not the people themselves 
that embody these representations. Rather, these representations have been 
(wrongfully) imposed on the people, again reaffirming a sense of victimhood. The 
thematization of the antinomy of victimhood/resilience comes to the fore when 
discussions turn to tangible political changes. Most problematic here, is of course the 
future status of Kosovo if Serbia joins the EU, as participants speculated that the EU 
would use membership as a bargaining chip to pressure Serbia into recognizing the 
independence of Kosovo.  
 
Excerpt 12: Novi Sad 1: 
M8: You know, we’re all aware that Kosovo is lost but my personal opinion is that 
people wouldn’t accept this publicly because we know that it’s one of the conditions 
that we’re asked to fulfil and who knows how many of these conditions are yet to 
come if we publicly say ‘okay, Kosovo isn’t ours’. How much more can they ask of 
us? 
 
EU conditionality then, particularly in relation to Kosovo, becomes seen as a 
normative pressure to strip Serbia of its ‘essence’, both geopolitically and 
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psychologically in order to become a better fit within the superordinate union. These 
sacrifices in turn are seen from a context of an asymmetric power-relationship, where 
Serbia is dependent on the EU for sustenance but in turn risk losing their identity in 
the process. This political tension with regards to EU integration is framed as a 
struggle between being victimized (by being pressured to give up Kosovo) and 
staying resilient (by never fully acknowledging or supporting its independence, no 
matter how ‘real’ it is). Consequently, while most participants voice concerns and 
worries about EU integration, ultimately many of them see no other alternative for the 
future (i.e., excerpt 9).  
 
 
The lack of alternatives comes not only from the censorship within the sphere of 
politics (i.e., Penic, Elcheroth & Reicher, 2016) , but more importantly, it becomes an 
ironic way of sustaining a sense of continuity in the future. By representing 
themselves as powerless (both domestically and internationally), individuals also strip 
themselves of any agency or responsibility in bringing about change, instead 
commending themselves on their ability to adapt, and adjust, to a corroding society. 
Ultimately then, these narratives function to provide individuals with a sense of 
security and stability; while everything around them is changing (potentially for the 
worst), at least they are able to maintain a sense of continuity with the past, and the 
sufferings of previous generations of Serbs.  
 
Conclusion 
At the heart of both the theme of the domestic and international context is a tension of 
answering the question of who we are, and in turn, how we should act. It was 
illustrated that the battle of Kosovo, serving as a foundational myth to the Serbian 
nation, communicates that Serbian identity is (and continues to be) an identity that is 
victimized but resilient and strong, an underdog that does not surrender without a 
fight.  
 
It is important to highlight here that this identity (as with all social identities) exists 
and is kept alive within communities of others, whether real or imagined. That is, 
“[m]eaning is always relational – and therefore the contestation of meaning can only 
occur in relationship.” (Howarth, 2006, p.77). In the present context we saw the 
meaning of history and identity be negotiated within a context of a domestic Other 
(politicians) and international Other (EU community). Namely, the thema of 
victimhood/resilience, embedded within a context of we/them, was utilized to 
construct an essentialized national identity, a process which functioned to adapt in-
group identity to a complex present and recent past, wrought with conflicts and 
ruptures. It further functioned to distance participants from those conflicts and 
ruptures, by positioning the ‘Other’ as a source of stigmatization (i.e., excerpts 7 and 
11), against which a positive sense of self was constructed and reaffirmed. This in 
turn allowed participants to become the embodiment of collective continuity of a 
historically old nation, despite circumstantial changes and challenges. Consequently, 
these processes of meaning-making became part and parcel of their justifications for, 
and rejections of, various political change.  
 
What this study then tells us is that, while history might weigh on the present, history 
is also utilized to give meaning to the present and to construct a particular version of 
the future, which is seen as aligned with a sense of collective continuity, both 
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historical and cultural (Jovchelovitch, 2012). By doing so, it inevitably has 
consequences for the present-day politics which become deemed legitimate for 
attaining this future, particularly when social knowledge and psychological 
attachment become intertwined and linked with existing geopolitical tensions. The 
empirical example draw on in this paper provides an interesting context in which to 
explore how these processes are negotiated as they occur, and the importance of 
considering not only the role of history, but also the role of place and space, in the 
construction of psychological belonging (Dixon & Hopkins, 2006).  
 
Research on historical representations, national identity and socio-political change 
should thus contemplate the importance of an interdisciplinary approach which 
considers not only the psychology behind these processes, but also the history through 
which they have developed, transformed and solidified, and the political 
consequences they bring. The SRT, coupled with a temporal understanding of 
identity, has the potential to allow us to do so. Namely, by considering how social 
representations become part of constructing continuity and how they become 
anchored in existing physical spaces, SRT can realize its full potential as a critical 
theory of both agency and resistance (Howarth, 2006). Thus, an interdisciplinary 
approach to socio-political change would consider the ways in which the meaning 
attributed to political actions emerge from the significance these actions have for 
promoting, or disrupting, a perceived continuity of the group’s identity and historical 
narrative. This can only be done by combining a thick description of the socio-
historical context and an analysis of its role in giving meaning to political and 
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Table 1: Participant Demographics 
 
Participant Gender Age Occupation City 
1 Male 55 Business owner Belgrade  
2 Female 28 Student (PhD) Belgrade 
3 Male 27 Insurance Agent Belgrade 
4 Female 28 NGO Employee Belgrade 
5 Male 25 Engineer Belgrade 
6 Male 29 Student  Belgrade 
7 Male 26 Engineer Belgrade 
8 Male 27 Journalist Belgrade 
9 Male 28 Unemployed Niš 
10 Male 30 Unemployed Niš 
11 Female 27 Retail Worker Niš 
12 Female 24 Student  Niš 
13 Female 27 Unemployed  Niš 
14 Female 24 Student Niš 
15 Male 28 Electrical Engineer Niš 
16 Male 26 Medical Technician Niš 
17 Female 50 Office clerk Niš 
18 Male 31 Architect Novi Sad 
19 Female 35 Architect Novi Sad 
20 Male 31 Accountant Novi Sad 
21 Male 31 Taxi Driver Novi Sad 
22 Male 30 Unemployed Novi Sad 
23 Male 28 Lawyer Novi Sad 
24 Male 34 Waiter Novi Sad 
25 Male 30 Military Employee Vranje 
26 Female 28 Military Employee Vranje 
27 Male     36 Unemployed Vranje 
28 Male 57 Self-employed farmer Vranje 
29 Female 55 Casino Employee Vranje 
30 Male 47 Lawyer Vranje 
31 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
32 Male 28 Military Employee Vranje 
 
 
Table 2: Focus Group Topic Guides 
FG1: Topic Guide 
General Questions to Start Discussion 
1. There have been many discussions about Serbia joining the EU. What have been some of the benefits and 
some of the downsides discussed?  
Identity / Compatibility 
2. What is your opinion about Serbia joining the EU? Are you for or against it?  
Meta-perspective 
3. Do you think Serbia is welcomed in the EU, from the perspective of other member countries? 
Politics 
4. Serbia has (or has had) a close relationship with Russia, which has at times conflicted with its pro-EU politics. 
Do you think that Serbia should be more political oriented towards Russia or the EU? Or both, if possible.  
5. In many media reports, EU membership and the question of the status of Kosovo have been placed in 
opposition. Do you think accepting Kosovo’s independence is worth it if it would guarantee Serbia 
membership into the EU? 
Future 
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6. When the year 2020 comes, the year by which politicians predict Serbia will have finally become a member, 
what do you realistically think the situation will look like?  
Identity (2) 
7. Considering the past 25 years and everything that has occurred in Serbia and the region, do you think that the 
people, as a nation, has changed in comparison with the past?  
 
FG2: Topic Guide 
General Question to Start Discussion 
1. When we last met in April I asked you if you thought Serbia joining the EU was a good idea, has your opinions 
changed at all since then?  
Identity / Compatibility 
2. Do you consider Serbian culture as compatible with European culture?  
3. Do you think Serbia’s way of life is representative of a European way of life? How are they similar, and how 
are they different?  
Meta-perspective 
4. Do you think that the majority of Serbia is pro- or against EU integration? 
Politics 
5. Since the EU integration process came on the Serbian agenda, there have been various government in Serbia in 
support or against the process. Who are some of the most important politicians in this process? 
6. do you feel like you can trust politicians in Serbia? 
Future 
7. If Serbia becomes a part of the EU in the future, do you think anything will change [in Serbia] and if so, what 
exactly? 
8. Do you think people in Serbia have a voice in shaping Serbia’s future and politics?  
 
FG3: Topic Guide 
General Question to Start Discussion 
1. Within our last two FGs there’s been a lot of talk about the politics around Kosovo. What is the historical 
significance of Kosovo? 
2. What are some media sources (whether it is print or broadcast TV) which you use and consider to be unbiased 
in their news-reporting? 
Politics 
3. What role do you think the media has is in shaping the political attitudes and opinions of people in Serbia?  
4. This year there is an election on the 24th April, do you plan to vote and if so, why?  
Meta-perspective 
5. Prompts 1 and 2: Texts from FGs in South (Nis and Vranje) introduced in North FGs (Novi Sad and Belgrade) 
and vice-versa to stimulate discussion (specifically, the prompts selected included both commonalities and 
differences to the discourses of the FG itself, and was intended to function as a way of engaging with the 
perspective of an ‘Other’)  
Future 
6. If you had the possibility to imagine the future of Serbia, how would this Serbia look?  
 
 
